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allow the supplier to "cover" debts which, for all practical purposes, are
uncollectible, and then sit back secure in the knowledge that he can sue on
the surety bond to recover for the materials furnished on the secured account.
The cases here under discussion, though issuing from different circuits,
evidence a definite unity in refinement of approach. The federal equity rule
concerning the application of payment can be seen as having experienced an
evolutionary development culminating in an alignment with the formulation
found in Section 388 of the Restatement of Contracts. It is unfortunate that
the reported case, as the most recent pronouncement on the subject, failed
to crystallize a more intelligible and firm guideline by which the business
world can function. It seems correct to state, however, that the federal
courts, in adjudicating future cases involving issues similar to those in the
reported case will be using the federal equity rule as formulated in Section
388 of the Restatement of Contracts.
LEO B. LIND
Securities Regulation—Section 10 (b)—Requirement of Sale—Long
Form and Short Form Mergers Are Sales.—Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.; 1
Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co. 2—In Dasho, Korholz, a director and major stock-
holder of American Gypsum Company, arranged with the directors of The
Susquehanna Corporation to purchase their Susquehanna stock at a price
in excess of market value. Korholz purchased the Susquehanna stock, then
sold it to Gypsum. Fulfilling their obligations to Korholz under the purchase
agreement, the Susquehanna directors passed control of Susquehanna to Kor-
holz through seriatim resignation of the incumbents and election of Korholz
as chairman and his nominees as directors. Using his position as chairman
of both corporations, Korholz obtained approval for a Susquehanna-Gypsum
merger from the respective boards of directors. Before the proposed merger
was submitted to the stockholders for their approval, Dasho and other Sus-
quehanna stockholders brought a stockholder derivative suit against the
new officers and directors of Susquehanna in the federal district court seeking
injunctive relief and damages. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had
conspired to defraud the corporation in violation of Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933? Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,4 and Rule 10b-S 5 since their activities would cause Susquehanna to
380 F.2d 262 (7th Qr.), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 480 (1967).
2 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 88 S. Ct. 463 (1967).
3 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964) provides in pertinent part: "(a) It shall be unlawful
for any person in the offer or sale of any securities ... (3) to engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchaser."
4 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange—
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
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acquire by indirection 435,000 shares of its own stock at a price $1,740,000
in excess of fair market value. Defendant directors denied no allegations of
fact, but urged dismissal on the ground that the transaction complained of
would be a merger and not a "sale" of securities as required in order to bring
the transaction within the coverage of the securities acts. The district court,
holding that a merger is not a "sale," granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss, and the plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit. HELD• Reversed. In the context of the antifraud
provisions of the securities acts, the word "sale" may reasonably include a
merger.
In the second case, Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co.,° Beneficial Finance
Company allegedly conspired with the directors of Crown Finance Com-
pany to acquire Crown for less than its worth as a going business. Crown
had two classes of issued stock: Class A, of which there were 624,870 shares
outstanding, and Class B, of which there were 46,500 shares outstanding. The
Class B stockholders were authorized to designate two-thirds of the board
of directors, and the Class A stockholders one-third. The officers and direc-
tors of Crown were its principal Class B stockholders and although they were
minority stockholders, they controlled the board of directors at the time that
Beneficial approached the Crown board.
Beneficial purchased the directors' Class B stock for approximately
$887,500 above its value, then made public offers to buy Class A stock—
offers which allegedly contained "materially misleading financial informa-
tion"7 and omitted "material information which would have apprised Class
A shareholders of their rights in the acquisition of their company . . . ." 8
When Beneficial had acquired 95 percent of all Crown stock, it effected a
short form merger which dissolved Crown and left Beneficial with a new
acquisition that, as planned, had cost it much less than if it had purchased
Crown's assets and liquidated the Class A and B stock at a price which
would have had to encompass the value of the going business. It was alleged
that if Beneficial had properly offered in merger to give Crown stockholders
cash for their stock, the Class A voting superiority would have blocked the
transaction or assured a just apportionment of the total price.
Vine, one of the holders of the five percent of Class A stock who found
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
6 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
7 Brief for Appellant, Appendix at 18-19, Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Corp., 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir. 1967) (Brief for SEC as Amiens Curiae at 3).
8 Id.
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his company merged without need of his consent, was faced with the alterna-
tive of either accepting Beneficial's offer to buy the remaining stock or of
pursuing his statutory right to have the court determine the value of his
stock before he sold it.° Instead of pursuing either alternative, Vine brought
suit on behalf of all Class A stockholders alleging that they had been de-
frauded by these transactions in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. Defendant Beneficial admitted the
facts as alleged but sought dismissal on the ground that plaintiff had failed
to state a cause of action because plaintiff was not a "seller" within the mean-
ing of section 10(b). The district court granted defendant's motion to dis-
miss, and the plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. HELD: Reversed. Since the merged-corporation stockholder,
as a result of the short form merger, must eventually exchange his shares
for money, the section 10(b) "sale" requirement is satisfied and the actual
exchange is unnecessary.
In each of these cases the court was required to decide whether a corpor-
ate merger is or involves a "sale of securities" as that phrase is used in the
antifraud provisions of the securities acts. In each of these cases the court
answered in the affirmative. Since the fact situations in the two cases differed,
the courts based their holding upon different grounds. Both courts reinforced
the theoretical bases of their decisions with a liberal use of public policy.
They failed, however, to analyze completely the technical aspects of merger
and sale and to demonstrate how in certain contexts the former can include
the latter so as to bring the merger within the antifraud provisions.'
9 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 910 (McKinney 1963) provides in pertinent part: "(a)
A shareholder of a domestic corporation shall, subject to and by complying with section
623 (Procedure to enforce shareholder's right to receive payment for shares), have
the right to receive payment of the fair value of his shares and the other rights and
benefits provided by such section . ." N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 623(h) (McKinney
1963) provides in pertinent part: "(4) . . . if the court finds that any dissenting share-
holder is so entitled [to receive payment for his shares], it shall proceed to fix the
value of the shares . ... The court may, if it so elects, appoint an appraiser to receive
evidence and recommend a decision on the question of fair value."
19 These two courts are not the first which have failed to explain their holdings
in terms of the merger procedure. In Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241
F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965), a case considered by the Vine court to be "on all fours,"
the plaintiff was granted relief without comment on the merger-sale problem. That court
was content to base its decision on a finding that because years earlier the plaintiff had
bought the stock now subject to the merger, plaintiff was a purchaser and as such
entitled to relief. The Voege court stated that:
It may be fairly inferred, however, that when plaintiff purchased her shares
she did rely upon the honesty and fair dealing of New Company and those
who controlled it. . . . Plaintiff at bar was the subject of deception for when
she acquired her stock she did so upon the justifiable assumption that any
merger would deal with her fairly, only later to find, according to the Complaint,
that the terms of the merger were designed to defraud her.
241 F. Supp. at 375. In Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297
(D. Conn. 1966), the court decided that deception of either the directors or the stock-
holders in connection with a merger will warrant a remedy under § 10(b). The Simon
court, having found deceit in connection with a merger, did not expressly state that
this was the equivalent of having found deceit in connection with a "sale," but by granting
relief where a "sale" was required, it raised the implication that a merger involves a "sale"
512
CASE NOTES
Merger is the term applied to the transaction whereby one corporation
absorbs another." The surviving corporation retains its name and corporate
identity while gaining the properties and franchises of the merged corpora-
tion which is dissolved.12
 State corporation statutes prescribe procedures for
mergers," generally classified as either long or short form mergers depending
on the time and effort required for consummation.
There are several steps in the consummation of a long form merger. First,
the directors of both companies agree on a plan of merger, the most impor-
tant element of which is the ratio of exchange of merged-corporation stock
for surviving-corporation stock. Then the proposed merger plan must be ap-
proved by at least a majority of the stockholders of the corporations involved
in the merger. If authorized by the requisite number of stockholders, the
directors file certain papers with a state official to finalize the transaction."
Finally, the surviving corporation issues its stock in return for stock of the
merged corporation which is turned in by the stockholders of that corporation
pursuant to the ratio of exchange in the merger plan.'b Upon consummation
of the merger, the assets and franchises of the merged corporation are deemed
to be transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation without further
for securities acts purposes. The Simon court indicated more directly than the Voege
court that merger is a "sale" for securities acts purposes, but was just as vague about
the theoretical basis of its decision.
11 Ahles Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 71 F.2d 150, 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 611 (1934).
12 Akwell Corp. v. Eiger, 141 F. Supp. 19, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Greater Adelphia
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Trilling, 121 Pa. Super. 469, 474-75, 183 A. 651, 653 (1936).
Consolidation, the other statutory method of corporate union, differs from merger in
that it effects a dissolution of the companies consolidating and a fusion of their assets
and franchises into a new corporation. White v. Melillo, 165 Misc. 318, 320, 300 N.Y.S.
1275, 1277-78 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937).
13 A merger must be carried out in conformity with the state law. As one court has
said, "Corporations as such only have such powers as are granted to them by the
sovereign power and their right to consolidate, if any, is derived solely from the
sovereignty which has the power to grant their organization as corporations." McRoberts
v. Minier, 270 III.. App. 1, 10 (1933).
14 Cal. Corp. Code § 4100-15 (West 1955). The Dar/to merger was effected under
the Illinois long form statute. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, §§ 157.61-.67 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
See, e.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.52 (1963).
15 Cf. In re Interhorough Consol. Corp., 267 F. 914, 917-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1920). The
plan of merger prepared by the directors of both corporations and submitted for stock-
holder approval determines how many shares in the surviving corporation will be issued
in exchange for merged-corporation stock. A fair ratio of exchange will "somehow spread
the prospective increments in value among the various participants." 2 J. Bonbright,
Valuation of Property 817 (1937). Three main ratio theories emerge.
The first is that the common stockholders of the constituent companies are
entitled to a ratio of exchange for the stock of the new company roughly in
proportion to the relative values of their shares (or of the net assets represented
by. their shares) in their particular companies considered as independent
enterprises. The. second is that the ratio of exchange should be based on the
relative contribution of each company to the value of the combined enterprise.
And the third is that there is no such thing as an "equitable" ratio of exchange,
but that the whole question must depend on the relative bargaining power of
the various classes and their constituted representatives.
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act or deed.i° The merger statutes provide that the surviving corporation will
assume the debts and obligations of the merged corporation.n The stock-
holder of the surviving corporation retains the same shares he had before
the merger.
A short form merger may be entered into if one of the corporations owns
a specified large percentage of the second corporation's stock. The short form
merger may be effected by action of the board of directors of the surviving
corporation without a vote of the holders of the small percentage of merged-
corporation stock not owned by the surviving corporation.'s A copy of the
board-approved merger plan must be distributed to all the shareholders of
each corporation to be merged. The plan must list the names of each such
corporation and present the manner and basis of converting shares of each
such corporation into cash or securities of the surviving corporation. The
short form merger takes effect upon the satisfaction of certain procedural
requirements. In some states merger is completed upon the filing of the
certificate of merger by the department of state; 19 others require the
recording of the certificate with the Secretary of State by the surviving
corporation."
Under a short form statute, the effect on both corporations and the stock-
holders of the surviving corporations is the same as under a long form stat-
ute. The merged-corporation stockholder may receive different treatment,
however. While long-form-merger statutes require the issuance of stock in
the surviving corporation to the stockholders of the merged corporation in
exchange for their old shares, short form mergers give the surviving corpora-
tion the option of either offering its shares in exchange for the merged cor-
poration's shares or forcing the stockholder of the merged corporation out of
the new corporation by redeeming his shares for cash. 2'
The preceding analysis of the elements of the long form merger in
Dasho and the short form merger in Vine is essential to a consideration of
whether such transactions involve sales of securities as required by the federal
securities legislation. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
use of any means . . . (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud ...."22 (Emphasis added.) Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act makes it unlawful for any person "[t]o use or employ, in connection
16 E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 4116 (West 1955); III. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.69(d)
(1954); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 906(6)(2) (McKinney 1963).
17 E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 4116 (West 1955); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 157.69(e)
(1954); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 21.53 (1963).
18 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 905(a) (McKinney 1963) provides: "Any domestic
corporation owning at least ninety-five percent of the outstanding shares of each class
of another domestic corporation or corporations may merge such other corporation into
itself without the authorization of the shareholders of any such corporation." Delaware
has the only other short form statute. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 253(a) (Supp. 1966).
The court in Vine did not decide which of these statutes controlled the Crown-Beneficial
merger, since Beneficial met the requirements of both. 374 F.2d at 633.
to N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 906(a) (McKinney 1963).
2° Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 253(a), (b) (Supp. 1966).
21 E.g., N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 905(a) (3) (McKinney 1963).
22 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
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with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive
device . . . ."23 (Emphasis added.) Defendants' claim that a merger is not
covered by the sections demands as analysis of "sale" as it is used in the
securities acts. Section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the de-
finitions section, provides that: "When used in this chapter, unless the con-
text otherwise requires— .. . (13) The terms 'buy' and `purchase' each
include any contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire. (14) The terms
'sale' and 'sell' each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 24
Statutes are presumed to be consistent with the common law unless the
statutory language clearly indicates a contrary legislative intent. 25 There ap-
pears to be no explicit indication in the Securities Exchange Act that the
words in the statute or its definitions section were intended to contradict the
common law. Thus an analysis of the common law "sale" is in order. The com-
mon law "sale" generally requires competent parties, a subject, a transfer, a
price and an intention to carry out the transaction." A competent party is a
person legally capable of taking part in a sale? 7 and any valuable possession
may be the subject matter of a sale. 2s The transfer is the passing of the sub-
ject matter or title thereto from one person to another;" and the price,
formerly thought to be payable exclusively in money, now may be paid in
any form of valuable consideration." The final element, intention to contract,
is the willful choice to enter into the transaction. The short form merger in
Vine apparently fails to satisfy these requirements on two points: first, one of
the parties, the alleged seller, did not exercise an intention to sell, on the
contrary, he was forced to sell; second, at the time of the suit, Vine had not
parted with possession of or title to his stock, nor had he received payment
for it. The issue is whether these elements or any part of them are essential
to a securities acts "sale."
The defendant in Vine argued strenuously that "[t]here admittedly was
no . . . sale contract with, or voluntary act by, [Vine] in the present
case."3I It is submitted that the defendant-Beneficial was looking to the
23 Id. § 78j.
24 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c (a) (13), (14) (1964). This Securities Exchange Act definition of
"sale" does not appear to materially alter that used in the Securities Act of 1933 which
provides:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
. .. .
(3) The term "sale" or "sell" shall include every contract of sale or disposi-
tion of a security or interest in a security, for value. The term "offer to sell",
"offer for sale", or "offer" shall include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value....
Id. § 77b (3).
25 Sullivan v. School Dist., 179 Wis. 502, 507, 191 N.W. 1020, 1022 (1923).
26 J. Benjamin, Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property 1 -11 (4th ed.
1884) ; 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 468 (12th ed. 1873) ; 2 Blackstone,
Commentaries *446.
27 See Vorbnoff v. Mesta Mach. Co., 286 Pa. 199, 205, 133 A. 256, 258 (1926).
28 St. Joseph Hydraulic Co. v. Wilson, 133 Ind. 465, 472, 33 N.E. 113, 115 (1893).
29 Commercial Discount Co. v. Cowen, 18 Cal. 2d 610, 615, 116 P.2d 599, 602 (1941).
56 Young v. Gerosa, 11 App. Div. 2d 67, 71, 202 N.Y.S.2d 470, 476 (1960).
31 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 6, Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir.); see also Brief for Appellee at 10, Id.
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wrong party in order to satisfy the volition requirement, for instead of looking
for volition on the part of the seller, it should have been looking for volition
on the part of the purchaser. The requirement of volition in the purchase
rather than the sale was stated by the Securities Exchange Commission in a
1938 report as follows: "The Commission's view has been that it is essential
to a 'sale' under section 2(3) that the prospective purchaser have the right
to individually and voluntarily elect whether or not to purchase." 32 (Emphasis
added.) A suggested inference that there is no requirement of volition on
the part of the seller is supported by the Uniform Commercial Code, which
defines sale as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price."33
Referring to the foreclosure proceeding as a sale, the U.C.C. obviously does
not consider seller's volition essential to a sale." Since, in the U.C.C., sale
is recognized to include involuntary transfers, the involuntary nature of the
seller's actions in a short form merger is arguably irrelevant to the existence
of a section 10(b) "sale." 35
Even if it is assumed that the common law generally requires an exercise
of volition on the part of the seller, situations have arisen in which exceptions
have been made." The involuntary sale which occurs through the exercise
of the eminent domain power is the most conspicuous example and arises in
a situation that bears a striking resemblance to the short form merger.
Eminent domain is the power of the state to force a landowner to sur-
render his property to the state for full consideration. 37 Several jurisdictions
adopt the theory that condemnation proceedings pursuant to the eminent
domain power result in compulsory sales of an owner's interest in his prop-
erty." Upon the decision of the statutorily prescribed authority to take land
for public use, the condemnee loses the use of his land because title is im-
mediately vested in the state and his prior rights are extinguished, if a definite
and adequate source of payment is provided." Similarly, when Beneficial
consummated the short form merger, Crown's assets vested in Beneficial and
Vine lost the beneficial ownership of his shares in Crown because the shares
no longer represented an ownership interest in an existing corporation."
Since the eminent domain taking can be treated as a sale regardless of the
32 SEC, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel
and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees pt. VII, at 249 n.172 (1938).
33 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-106(1).
34 Id. §§ 9-501(5), -504.
35 Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 8, Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627
(2d Cir. 1967).
so 1 S. Williston, Sales § 4 (Rev. Ed. 1948).
32 United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1883).
38 E.g., Stockton Harbor Indus. Co. v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 638, 651 (9th Cir.
1954); Pedrotti v. Marin County, 152 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Pierce County
v. King, 47 Wash. 2d 328, 333, 287 P.2d 316, 319 (1955). Another prominent theory . is
that the condemnation proceeding is a proceeding in rem. Under this theory the power
of eminent domain acts on the land rather than on the title to the land. The state, in
such a case, does not claim its title through the divested owner as would be the case
in a sale. On the contrary, the decree recognizes an independent title in the state. United
States v. 127.03 Acres of Land, 148 F. Supp. 904 (D. Puerto Rico 1957).
3° Adirondack Ry: v. New York, 176 U.S. 335 (1900).
40 See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
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fact that it is completely involuntary on the part of the landowner-"seller," 4 '
the involuntary nature of the taking in a short form merger should not pre-
clude such merger from being considered a bona fide variety of sale. 42 Thus
even if the common law is assumed to control the meaning of "sale" as it is
used in the securities acts, there is precedent for deeming Vine a "seller,"
regardless of his lack of volition.
If 'arguendo the involuntary sale is deemed not a part of the common
law, the definition in the securities acts contains indications that Congress
"clearly" intended to include involuntary sale within the statutory coverage.
Certainly the broad language of the definitions sections of the securities acts
encourages courts to construe as "sales" those transactions which may not
comply in all particulars with the common law. 43 The use of the intro-
ductory phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" appears to invite
the courts to look beyond the strict language of the statute. It encourages
the courts to "read the text in the light of the context!'" There are other
words in the definitions section which appear to require a broad construction
of "sale." The use of "include" rather than "means" to introduce the defini-
tion is an example. The verb "include" allows the courts, when the situation
presents itself, to look beyond the ennumerated definitions of "sale" to a
consideration of unlisted types of transactions. 45 Finally, the words "or other-
wise dispose of present an alternative for "sale" which can hardly be said
to discourage interpretation. One obvious interpretation of the phrase is
that, as opposed to the preceding phrase, "contract to sell," it might include
a transaction that does not require volition.
If Vine can be a "seller" without an exercise of volition, the next question
becomes whether he has "sold" without parting with title or possession of the
shares in return for valuable consideration. The court in Vine dealt primarily
with this issue. It stated that Vine must exchange the shares for money to
become a party to a "sale," but, since he eventually will do so, it would be a
"needless formality" to require such a physical transfer as a condition to suit.
Thus only if the physical transfer will inevitably occur can the plaintiff make
out a cause of action. It is submitted that the "sale" takes place far earlier in
the series of events than the transfer of the stock for money and that the
41 Cases cited note 38 supra.
42 Some securities act cases have imposed a requirement of reliance by a seller-
plaintiff who claims to have been defrauded. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,
462-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) ; Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d
260, 266-68 (1st Cir. 1966). That is, the method of deception must be of such a nature
that a reasonable man would have acted upon it to his detriment. Since the short form
merger requires no active participation by the merged-corporation stockholders, there
was no reliance by Vine upon any allegedly fraudulent activities of the defendant. The
court must discard the reliance requirement when it finds an involuntary sale if the
plaintiff in such a suit is to recover. The Vine court recognized this problem and stated
that "[w]hatever need there may be to show reliance in other situations, . . . we
regard it as unnecessary in the limited instance when no volitional act is required and
the result of a forced sale is exactly that intended by the wrongdoer." 374 F.2d at 635
(citations omitted).
43 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(3), 78c(a) (13), (14) (1964).
44 SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
45 United States v. Robertson, 181 F. Supp. 158, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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court's emphasis on the inevitability of this transfer was apparently mis-
placed. By short form merger and the resultant dissolution of the merged cor-
poration, the surviving-corporation directors effectively removed the bene-
ficial ownership of the minority stock and replaced it with a claim for cash
A corporation's stock is valuable because it earns dividends, has a speculative
value and represents a portion of the net corporate assets. Upon dissolution
of the corporation these benefits of ownership terminate because the corpora-
tion ceases to exist. When the beneficial ownership is removed, the merged-
corporation stockholder receives an equitable claim for compensation in ac-
cordance with the merger plan announced by the surviving corporation before
the beneficial ownership was terminated." This "exchange" of beneficial
ownership of the stock fora claim for cash is, on analysis, the "sale;" and the
exchange of the merged-corporation stock for money is truly a needless
formality, a mere liquidation of a claim for cash Thus the court was correct
in deeming the exchange of stock for cash a needless formality, but incorrect
in citing the inevitability of the exchange as the reason for so holding.
All the elements required to constitute a "sale" in the case of Vine's short
form merger are present in Dasho's long form merger. A long form merger
causes the same dissolution of the merged corporation and subsequent loss to
the merged-corporation stockholders of the beneficial ownership of their
stock. This loss raises the same right to compensation in merged-corporation
stockholders as was created by the short form merger. Similarly, therefore,
this exchange of beneficial ownership of stock for a claim for surviving-
corporation securities is a "sale." The only distinction between the long form
and the short form cases is that in the former, the merged-corporation stock-
holders receive stock while in the latter, they may receive cash. Since the stock
received by the merged-corporation stockholders is valuable consideration,
this is a distinction without a difference.
In every long form merger there is, in effect, an exchange of the stock
in the surviving corporation for the stock in the merged corporation Each
party to a stock-for-stock exchange is a "seller" of securities." Securities are
given up in return for valuable consideration which is in the form of other
securities. In Vine, and in the foregoing discussion of Dasho, the merged-
corporation stockholder has been considered the "seller." In a long form
merger, however, the mechanics of the transaction could also lend
themselves to the interpretation that the surviving corporation is a "seller."
Since the method of exchange in a long form merger is issuance of stock, the
question is whether an issuance of stock pursuant to a merger is a "sale."
The most recent case dealing with this issue is Ruckle v. Rota American
Corp.," which held that the issuance of stock by a corporation is a "sale." In
Ruckle, certain corporate directors sought to preserve their control of the
corporation. They concealed the true financial condition of the corporation
and fraudulently induced the remaining directors to authorize an issuance
of stock which was acquired by the president for cash. A derivative suit was
46 See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 302-03, 93 A.2d 107,
112 (1952).
47 See United States v. Wernes, 157 F.2d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 1946).
48 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
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filed on behalf of Roto American Corporation alleging fraud in connection
with a sale of securities. The court held that "the issuance by a corporation
of its own shares is a 'sale' to which the anti-fraud policy expressed in the
federal securities laws extends."'"
Ruckle relied" on Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp.51 which also
held that the issuance of stock is a "sale." Hooper involved a derivative suit on
behalf of Consolidated American Industries in which fraud in connection with
a sale of securities was alleged. The several defendants allegedly conspired
to induce Consolidated to issue 700,000 shares of its stock to Mid-Atlantic
Development Co. in return for that company's assets. Having issued its stock
to Mid-Atlantic, Consolidated did not receive the valuable assets it had sought
to acquire. The court of appeals held that the transaction was a "sale" within
the meaning of the securities acts. The court found that the transferee of the
stock, Mid-Atlantic, had properties of value that it was willing to transfer
in consideration for the stock. It realized also that Consolidated desired to
issue its valuable stock to acquire this property. Having found these "earmarks
of a sale,"52 the court felt that " [n]either statutory terminology nor prac-
tical business legal considerations support the contention that, as a matter of
law, Consolidated in issuing its stock was not a seller and the transaction was
not a sale." 53 Ruckle and Hooper indicate that a "sale" occurs when stock is
issued by a corporation for value.
Dasho appears to be controlled by Ruckle and Hooper, for as in those
cases, the stock was issued for valuable consideration—the assets of the
merged corporation. The acquisition of these assets is undoubtedly a benefit
to the surviving corporation. By the same transaction, the merged-corporation
stockholders directly and individually lose the beneficial ownership of their
shares, an obvious detriment. But the stockholders of the merged corporation
do not own the corporate assets, and the question is how can they logically
be termed "sellers" of assets that they do not own. This question is more form
than substance, however, because the stockholders own the corporation which,
in turn, owns the assets. Therefore, when the stockholders as a group au-
thorize and direct the corporation to dissolve and to transfer its assets on
merger, they are in effect, if not technically, "selling" the assets of the merged
corporation to the surviving corporation. 54 The receipt of these assets by the
surviving corporation creates an obligation to compensate the merged-corpora-
tion stockholders. This compensation to the merged-corporation stockholder
43 Id. at 27.
55 Id.
51 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S 814 (1961).
52 Id. at 202.
53 Id. at 203.
54 Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (1931). The court
in the Cole case stated:
While a consolidation is quite different from a sale, yet from the viewpoint
of the constituent companies, a sale of assets is in substance involved. Here
it is the sale feature of the merger and that alone with which we are
concerned. . . . [T]he stockholders of the defendant are in substance selling
its assets to another in exchange for securities issued by the latter ..
Id. at 57, 156 A. at 188.
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takes the form of an issuance of stock by the surviving corporation. The
issuance of stock in conjunction with a merger fulfills the requirements of
Ruckle and Hooper, and results in a securities act "sale." Thus the long form
merger involves a "sale" of securities so as to afford an injured party a remedy
under the antifraud provisions of the securities acts.
The foregoing analysis has revealed that a technical "sale" exists in
both the long form and the short form merger. In neither of the noted cases
did the court feel such an analysis was necessary to the decision, choosing
instead to rely upon the congressional intent manifested in the legislative
history of the securities acts. Although these courts probably reached a result
which was consistent with the equities of the cases, such a method of dealing
with this important securities law issue is an unsatisfactory method of devel-
oping a stable body of law. Until the courts face the problem of whether
merger involves a "sale" in a manner which is consistent with corporate
law and the financial realities of merger transactions, the freedom of judges
to interpret legislative history will remain unimpaired and the rights and
responsibilities of the financial community and the investing public under
the securities laws will be uncertain.
PETER W. BROWN
Securities Regulation—Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Voting Trust
Regulated Under Section 14(a).—Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon.'
—A group of shareholders of Greater Iowa Corporation organized a voting
trust2 with the objective of controlling the corporation or gaining a voice in
its management. The voting-trust organizers, dissatisfied with the corpora-
tion's management apparently because of poor earnings and a decline in
stock value, solicited memberships for the "Iowa Trust" from 45 of the
12,000 Greater Iowa Corporation shareholders. Solicitation was carried out
Mainly on a person-to-person basis in Iowa, but memberships were also sought
by mail and telephone from shareholders in other states.
Plaintiffs, Greater Iowa Corporation, its directors and three shareholders
purporting to represent the class of all shareholders in the corporation,
brought an action to enjoin all further activity of the trust. 3 According to
plaintiffs, the Iowa Trust had failed to register its securities 4 with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 5 had made deceptive statements in its
1 378 F.2d 783 (8th Or. 1967).
2 In general, the voting trust is a device for concentrating the voting power of several
shareholders into one party so that the latter may control or have partial control of the
corporation. To participate in a voting trust, the shareholder transfers his shares in
the corporation to trustees. The trustees then become holders of legal title to the shares,
with power to vote them at shareholders' meetings.
3 Brief for Appellant at 5, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967).
4 Under the Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964), a voting-trust
certificate is defined as a "security," so that it is regulated under the securities acts. A
voting trust issues such certificates to its participating shareholders to indicate the number
of shares delivered to it by the shareholder.
5 As required by the Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1964), and
the Investment Company Act of 1940 § 7(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(a) (1) (1964).
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